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Rainfall index insurance provides a payout based 
on measured local rainfall during key phases of the 
agricultural season, and in principle can help rural 
households diversify a key source of idiosyncratic risk. 
This paper describes basic features of rainfall insurance 
contracts offered in India since 2003, and documents 
stylized facts about market demand and the distribution 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to  understand the weather based index insurance market in India. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at xgine@worldbank.org.   
of payouts. The authors summarize the results of previous 
research on this market, which provides evidence 
that price, liquidity constraints, and trust all present 
significant barriers to increased take-up. They also discuss 
potential future prospects for rainfall insurance and other 
index insurance products.  
Microinsurance: A Case Study of the Indian Rainfall Index Insurance 
Market 
Xavier Giné, World Bank 
Lev Menand, Yale Law School 
Robert Townsend, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
James Vickery, Federal Reserve Bank of New York  
1. Introduction 
Households in India and other developing nations are often critically exposed to extreme 
weather-related events, including drought, flood, tidal waves, and hurricanes. For example, in a 
household survey conducted by us in Andhra Pradesh, 89% of surveyed rural landowners cited 
drought as the most important single risk faced by the household (Giné, Townsend, and Vickery, 
2008). Weather shocks often affect all households in a local geographic area, making some forms 
of risk coping, such as seeking help from nearby family, friends, and neighbors, relatively less 
effective. Globally, household exposure to extreme weather events is likely to increase over 
future decades due to climate change as well as population growth in risk-sensitive areas.
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Efforts have been made in India and other countries in recent years to develop formal 
insurance markets to improve diversification of weather-related income shocks. The goal of this 
chapter is to survey the features of one of these markets, the Indian rainfall index insurance 
market. “Index insurance” refers to a contract whose payouts are linked to a publicly observable 
index; in this case, the index is cumulative rainfall recorded on a local rain gauge during 
different phases of the monsoon season.
2 This form of insurance is now available at a retail level  
in many parts of India, although these markets are still in their relative infancy in terms of 
product design and distribution. 
Rainfall insurance is only one of a growing range of “microinsurance” products gaining 
popularity in the developing world. Other examples include policies relating to health, livestock, 
accidental death and disability, property, weather, and microenterprise risk. Lloyd’s (2009) 
estimates that around 135 million low-income individuals around the world already make use of 
microinsurance in some form and estimates a potential final market size of 1.5 billion to 3 billion 
households. Growth in these markets reflects a broadening of efforts toward greater financial 
access for the poor to include insurance and savings products in addition to microcredit. 
A key challenge for microinsurance, as for other microfinance products, is to design it so 
as to minimize transaction costs and ameliorate incentive problems—factors which can 
otherwise make financial services to the poor prohibitively expensive. The key feature of rainfall 
index insurance that assists in this regard is that payouts are calculated on the basis of a publicly 
observed and exogenous variable: local rainfall. This significantly reduces transaction costs, 
because the household does not need to formally file a claim and the insurance company does not 
need to do an inspection to estimate the amount of loss. Since rainfall data are observed in close 
to real time, this also means that claims can in principle be calculated and disbursed quickly to 
affected households. The use of an index also greatly reduces incentive problems, because the 
household is unlikely to have significant private information about the distribution of future 
rainfall shocks and because the household cannot misreport the size of its loss.
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The main disadvantage of index insurance is potential basis risk between the rainfall 
index and the actual income loss suffered by the household. This will be greater, for example, 
when the distance between the insured household and the rain gauge is larger or when actual  
yields correlate poorly with the rainfall index. In addition, while index insurance is in part 
designed to minimize transaction costs, these costs may still be significant relative to the modest 
value of insurance purchased by an average policyholder, making the product expensive, at least 
by comparison with insurance in the developed world. Finally, even if the insurance product is 
well designed, other frictions may prevent households from purchasing it. For example, 
households may be liquidity constrained, may not have a sufficient level of financial literacy to 
properly evaluate the product, or may not fully trust the insurance provider. 
As part of this chapter, we describe the basic structure of rainfall insurance contracts 
commonly sold in India and present some stylized facts on the distribution of returns on the 
insurance. While aggregate data on market size and growth are difficult to come by, we do 
document changes in product demand over time, summarizing data generously provided by the 
microfinance institution BASIX. 
We also describe stylized facts regarding the types of households that buy insurance and 
factors that inhibit demand for insurance, summarizing results of academic research conducted 
by three of us (Giné et al. 2008). Among our findings, we show that product demand is quite 
price sensitive, suggesting that increased economies of scale and competition could lead via 
lower prices to significant increases in insurance take-up. Our previous research shows, however, 
that other frictions—such as financial constraints and the level of trust of the household in the 
insurance provider—are also important for take-up. We conclude with a discussion of the future 
of rainfall insurance and other related index insurance products. 
2. Monsoon Variation and Production Risk 
In 2007, agriculture in India accounted for 18.6% of GDP, employed more than 60% of the 
country’s population, and used 43% of its arable land (Hohl and Kannan, 2007). The country  
largely depends on temporal and spatial diversification of rainfall to smooth weather-induced 
volatility in incomes, especially since only 30% of land used for agriculture is irrigated (Gadgil 
et al. 2002; Rao et al. 2000). 
Several papers show that household incomes in India are sensitive to rainfall variation. 
Parchure (2002) estimates that around 90% of variation in Indian crop-production levels is due to 
rainfall volatility. Using macrodata from 1951 to 2003, Gadgil and Gadgil (2006) find that 
despite substantial decreases in the contribution of agriculture to Indian GDP, severe droughts 
have resulted in decreases between 2% and 5% of GDP throughout the period. A World Bank 
(2006) study of adaptation strategies to droughts in Andhra Pradesh finds that, based on 
simulations of a crop model, severe droughts (one in 30 years) are likely to decrease rice yields 
from 29% to 62%, depending on the district. Yield losses of rain-fed crops also appear high, with 
different crops being particularly vulnerable in different districts. Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
(1993) also present evidence that weather shocks significantly affect agricultural profits, based 
on ICRISAT panel data from the 1980s. 
[Figure 6.1 here] 
Figure 6.1 shows the actual onset of the monsoon over Kerala as announced by the Indian 
Meteorological Department (IMD) as deviations in days from the normal onset of June 1. It is 
clear that there is significant volatility. This volatility, however, would be less of a concern if 
available forecasts of the onset were accurate, since if they were, farmers could use them to adapt 
their agricultural production decisions accordingly. The IMD issues a single long-range forecast 
of the onset of the monsoon over Kerala around May 15. Despite recent advances in forecasting 
techniques, even the onset conditional on the IMD forecast still displays substantial volatility. 
Figure 6.2 shows the difference in days between the forecast and the actual onset for each year. 
(For example, in 2005 the IMD forecast that the monsoon would arrive in Kerala on June 13; as  
it actually arrived on June 5, the difference is 8 days.) This residual uncertainty in the monsoon 
is reflected in a long and rich folk tradition of methods to predict the arrival of the rains.
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[Figure 6.2 here] 
Our survey data from Andhra Pradesh provides direct evidence that uncertainty about 
monsoon onset is costly. In 2006 about a quarter of our sample had replanted in the past, and 
73% had abandoned the crop at least once in the past ten years due to insufficient rain after the 
sowing period. Respondents report that the extra expense borne by those that replant is large, 
equivalent to 20% of average total production expenses. This suggests that farmers would benefit 
from having accurate prior information about the onset of the monsoon (Gadgil et al. 2002). 
In Giné, Townsend, and Vickery (2010), we find evidence that farmers’ beliefs about the 
monsoon are related to the benefits of having more accurate prior information. In particular, 
when farmers with less access to risk-coping mechanisms had more accurate prior information, 
the increased accuracy led to average income gains of 8% to 9% of agricultural production. 
3. Do Households Need Formal Rainfall Insurance? 
Innovative risk-management tools, like the rainfall insurance products discussed in this chapter, 
are beneficial for household welfare only if other existing risk-sharing mechanisms are 
inadequate (Townsend 1994; Morduch 1995; Lim and Townsend 1998). “Risk sharing” 
encompasses a wide range of different methods, including the following, that households use to 
protect their consumption and living standards from a poor monsoon or other adverse events. 
•  Drawing on accumulated savings of liquid assets (cash, bank account balances, 
etc.). 
•  Selling other assets (jewelry, land, livestock, etc.).  
•  Borrowing from moneylenders, microfinance institutions (MFIs), banks, or other 
financial institutions. 
•  Informal risk-sharing arrangements with neighbors, friends, or family. For 
example, if the household suffers an adverse shock, there may be an increase in 
remittance income sent by family members living abroad or in financial assistance 
provided by other households living in the same village, at least to the extent that 
those households are not themselves affected by the same shock. 
•  Government assistance (government work programs, drought-assistance programs 
etc.). 
•  Formal insurance arrangements (e.g. government crop insurance or the rainfall 
insurance product considered here). 
If these mechanisms are insufficient, households affected by a drought or other adverse weather 
events will experience a decline in consumption or be forced to make costly adjustments 
involving labor supply, production, family planning, or migration decisions (e.g. moving to an 
urban area to find work if the monsoon crops fail). Each of these responses involves a potentially 
significant welfare cost for the household. In addition, as emphasized by Morduch (1995), 
households vulnerable to risk may also engage in a variety of costly ex ante “income smoothing” 
activities that may reduce income variability but also lower the average income. For example, a 
household with low savings concerned about monsoon risk may underinvest in fertilizer or 
hybrid seeds at the start of the monsoon season because of a desire to maintain a stock of liquid 
savings in case the harvest fails (Gautam, Hazell, and Alderman 1994; Sakurai and Reardon 
1997).  
We note that monsoon variation may be more difficult for households to smooth than 
other adverse events, because a bad monsoon affects virtually every household in a local rural 
geographic area. This makes several of the risk-sharing mechanisms described above less 
effective. For example, informal risk-pooling arrangements among neighbors will not work, 
because every household will have experienced a decline in agricultural income. Asset sales may 
also be less effective as a way to compensate for lost income, simply because all households will 
be seeking to sell assets at the same time (Hazell and Ramasamy 1991). This in principle could 
push down prices in the local asset market, due to a “cash in the market” or “fire sale” effect, an 
idea that is modeled formally in Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
Previous research suggests that the mechanisms listed above do play an important role in 
reducing the effects of income shocks on consumption and welfare. For example, Townsend 
(1994) tests the benchmark of complete risk sharing at the village level among rural households 
in three villages in India. Under this benchmark, consumption of each household commoves only 
with aggregate consumption of the village and is not disproportionately affected by idiosyncratic 
income shocks of the household. Consumption patterns are found to be surprisingly close to the 
complete risk-sharing benchmark, although insurance is found to be somewhat less complete for 
poorer households. Focusing on rainfall shocks, Paxson (1992) finds that saving and dissaving 
by Thai households absorbs a large fraction of movements in transitory household income due to 
rainfall variation. Yang and Choi (2007) and Miller and Paulson (2007) find that remittance 
income responds significantly to rainfall shocks, ameliorating the effects of income fluctuations 
on household consumption. 
Despite these encouraging findings, a range of evidence also suggests many households 
remain significantly underinsured against weather risk and other related shocks. Maccini and  
Yang (2009) present empirical evidence using Indonesian data that for females, local rainfall 
variation around the time of birth significantly affects schooling, health, and socioeconomic 
status measured in adulthood, inconsistent with the notion that households are diversified against 
rainfall risk. Duflo and Udry (2004) reject the null of perfect risk sharing with respect to rainfall 
shocks even within households. They show that rainfall-induced relative income shocks to 
female-tended crops cause changes in the relative expenditure share of goods favored by women, 
such as child education. Dercon and Outes (2009) present evidence that rainfall shocks generate 
plausibly exogenous variation in income that can lead to poverty traps. 
Furthermore, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) present evidence that households do 
engage in costly “income smoothing” in response to rainfall risk, activities which they estimate 
significantly reduce average income. Using Indian data, these authors estimate that a one-
standard-deviation increase in average rainfall volatility is associated with a statistically 
significant reduction in risk taking and profits, equivalent to 15% of average profits for the 
median farmer and 35% of average profits for the bottom wealth quartile. Less directly focused 
on rainfall shocks, Morduch (1995) and Townsend (1994) present evidence that poor households 
are further from the full risk-sharing benchmark than wealthy households. 
Household responses to qualitative surveys conducted by us in Andhra Pradesh are also 
consistent with the proposition that households are not fully insured against rainfall shocks. In a 
2004 survey, we asked households to list the three most important sources of risk they face. 
Notably, 89% of farmers cited drought as the most significant source of risk. (See Giné et al. 
[2008] for a table summarizing results of this question.) In addition, in surveys conducted in 
Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, households that chose not to purchase insurance against rainfall 
risk were asked why. Only a very small fraction of these households (between 2% and 25%,  
depending on the sample) cited “do not need insurance” as an explanation for nonpurchase. (See 
Section 7 of this chapter for more details.) 
We conclude this section by noting our view that, despite the significant body of research 
cited above, the literature studying the effect of monsoon quality on consumption, health, 
savings, labor supply, and so on is still very much incomplete. Much more needs to be 
understood about exactly how rural households respond to an event like a severe drought, how 
large the welfare consequences are, and how those costs are distributed among households. We 
believe that further careful, systematic research on these questions would be very valuable, 
especially given the potential for climate change to amplify weather variation in future years and 
decades. 
4. Contract Features 
In India, formal rainfall insurance contracts were first developed by the general insurer ICICI 
Lombard, with technical assistance from the World Bank (Hess 2003; Bryla and Syroka 2007; 
Hazell et al. 2010). The ICICI Lombard product was piloted in 2003 in the Mahabubnagar 
district of Andhra Pradesh, a semiarid region in south-central India; this pilot was expanded to 
also include villages in Ananthapur in 2004. These pilot areas are also the study area for field 
research conducted by us, which has involved a series of household surveys and field 
experiments conducted since 2004. Over time, rainfall insurance has become more available 
across many parts of India, and policies are also now underwritten by competing firms, including 
IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Company and the government company Agricultural Insurance 
Company of India (AIC). Total amounts sold each year remain relatively modest, however (see 
Section 5 for a more detailed discussion of the market structure and growth).  
In this section we describe institutional features of these rainfall insurance contracts. We 
focus on policies sold by ICICI Lombard but also discuss competing products. At the end of the 
section, we describe the distribution networks used to sell policies to households. 
4.1 Coverage period and contract basis 
Policies cover rainfall during the primary monsoon season, known as the Kharif. This is the 
prime cropping season, which runs from approximately June to September. (Some farmers also 
plant a second irrigation-fed crop, called the Rabi, during the winter season). 
For purposes of contract design, the Kharif is divided into three contiguous, sequential 
phases, each 35 to 45 days in length, intended to correspond to the agricultural phases of sowing, 
vegetative growth, and harvest. Insurance payouts in the first two phases are linked to deficient 
rainfall. That is, the policy provides a positive payout if rainfall during the phase is below a 
particular threshold, or “strike,” level. In the third phase, corresponding to harvest, this is 
reversed; the insurance provides a high payout if rainfall is higher than the threshold. This is 
meant to protect farmers against heavy rains causing damage to mature crops. 
4.2 How is rainfall measured? 
Each policy is linked to rainfall at a particular rain gauge during a phase or phases of the 
monsoon. ICICI Lombard policies are linked either to gauges maintained by the Indian 
Meteorological Department (IMD) or to automatic gauges maintained by private vendors such as 
NCMSL. Policies are then marketed to households that live in areas close to the gauge. For each 
study village in Andhra Pradesh, the insurance product offered to households is based on a gauge 
located no more than 20 kilometers from the village, generally significantly less. 
4.3 Contract design  
For each phase, the underlying index variable used to calculate payouts is accumulated rainfall 
between the start date and end date of the phase, measured at a given reference weather station.
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The start of the first phase, rather than being a fixed calendar date, is set based on the monsoon 
rains. Namely, it begins on the first date on which accumulated rain since June 1 exceeds 50 
millimeters or on July 1 if accumulated rain since June 1 is below 50 millimeters. 
As an example, consider the contract linked to rainfall in phase 1 of the 2006 monsoon, 
measured at the Mahabubnagar Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) weather station. The 
structure of this contract is presented in Figure 6.3, below (source: Giné et. al. 2007). Although 
contracts differ, the basic structure shown in Figure 6.3 is broadly representative of the contracts 
underwritten by ICICI Lombard. 
[Figure 6.3 here] 
As the figure shows, the policy pays zero if accumulated rainfall during the phase 
exceeds an upper threshold, or “strike,” which in this case is 70 millimeters. Otherwise, the 
policy pays 10 rupees for each millimeter of rainfall deficiency relative to the strike, until the 
lower threshold, or “exit,” is reached. If rainfall is below the exit value, which in this case is 10 
millimeters, the policy pays a fixed, higher indemnity of 1,000 rupees. This exit level is meant to 
approximately correspond to crop failure. The choice of this nonlinear payout structure was in 
part made based on the use of crop models, in an attempt to maximize the correlation between 
rainfall deficiency and loss of crop yield. 
This example is for insurance on a single segment of the monsoon; in this case the first 
phase, corresponding to sowing. In general, households may choose to purchase policies for an 
individual phase of the monsoon or a single policy covering all three phases.  
Rainfall index contracts offered by other underwriters differ somewhat from this 
structure. For example, Cole et al. (2009) also discuss insurance offered to households in the 
state of Gujarat, which is underwritten by IFFCO-Tokio. These policies have a simpler structure 
covering cumulative rainfall over the entire monsoon. 
4.4 Distribution networks 
ICICI Lombard and other Indian rainfall insurance underwriters do not generally sell insurance 
policies directly to farmers. Instead they use brokers, or they partner in each rural area with local 
financial institutions which have well-established networks for the provision of financial services 
to rural households. Thanks to the 2005 Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
(IRDA) regulations, nongovernmental organizations, microfinance institutions, and self-help 
groups are legally recognized as microinsurance agents, thus increasing the potential for 
coverage (IRDA, 2005). In our study areas, product marketing and distribution is performed by 
the company Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank of BASIX, a large microfinance 
institution. In areas where it is active, BASIX has a network of local agents, known as 
Livelihood Services Agents (LSAs), who market a range of credit, savings, and insurance 
products to rural households. See Cole and Tufano (2007) for a discussion of the business 
environment facing BASIX. 
BASIX receives a commission for each sale to cover marketing costs and payout 
disbursements. At the end of the rainfall insurance coverage period, ICICI Lombard calculates 
payouts based on measured rainfall and provides funds to BASIX. BASIX then distributes 
payouts to households through their LSA network, typically by setting up a meeting or collection 
station in each village to distribute payouts once they become available.  
To date, payouts have generally been made available to farmers by ICICI Lombard only 
some months after the end of the monsoon season. This in part reflects delays in certifying 
weather records by the IMD. However, we believe that this process could be sped up 
significantly, given that rainfall can in principle be measured almost in real time. Reducing the 
delay between the realization of rainfall shocks and the settlement of claims should significantly 
improve the attractiveness of the product, particularly for households facing liquidity constraints. 
For example, payouts relating to phase 1 (sowing) of the monsoon could be made during the 
monsoon season itself, providing funds to help with the replanting of crops in the wake of crop 
failure. 
5. Market Structure and Growth 
Even before weather insurance became available in 2003, Indian farmers seeking to protect their 
crops could in principle attempt to do so through government crop insurance. India began to pilot 
crop insurance in a limited way between 1972 and 1978. These early pilots were succeeded by 
the Pilot Crop Insurance Scheme (PCIS) of the 1979–1984 period and, afterward, the 
Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) of 1985–1999. Both PCIS and CCIS were 
targeted to farmers with loans from financial institutions. While the PCIS was voluntary, 
purchase of a CCIS policy was compulsory if a loan was taken from a formal financial 
institution. In 1999 the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) was introduced, 
replacing the CCIS. NAIS is available to borrowers and nonborrowers, although the vast 
majority of clients remain those forced to buy insurance as a condition of receiving a loan. 
Each of the schemes described above employs an “area approach.” An insurance payout 
is triggered if measured crop yields from the area fall below a certain threshold, based on crop-
cutting experiments conducted on a sample of monitored selected plots. Distinct from the earlier  
schemes, NAIS is based on an area approach for drought and similar widespread calamities but 
also includes an “individual approach” for localized weather events, such as landslides, floods 
and the like. 
Premiums for crop insurance, which depend on the crop grown, are subsidized by 50% 
for small and marginal farmers. The subsidy is shared equally by the central and state 
governments. In 2007 NAIS covered close to 20 million farmers in 23 Indian states and spanned 
over 30 different crops during the Kharif and 25 crops during Rabi season. Annual premiums 
collected are around US$150 million, covering 10% of sown area and 7% of farmers. 
Despite the high subsidies and a resulting high ratio of claims to premiums (Sinha 2004; 
Raju and Chand 2007; Nair 2010), voluntary purchase of government insurance by farmers is 
very low. This likely reflects in part a number of limitations in product design, which are 
discussed in detail in Kalavakonda and Mahul (2004) and also in the online Appendix S1 of Giné 
et al. (2008). In particular, (1) NAIS applies a uniform premium for each crop type, leading to 
mispricing and adverse selection; (2) understanding of the insurance is limited, and purchasing 
and claiming payouts involve significant administrative costs; (3) not all crops are covered by the 
scheme; (4) in some areas the geographic unit over which crop-cutting experiments are 
conducted is large, generating excessive basis risk; (5) claims take on average a year to be settled 
after the growing season; and (6) crop-cutting experiments are expensive to conduct and may 
produce noisy results if not conducted in large enough samples. 
Following initial pilot tests of ICICI rainfall insurance in 2003, IFFCO-Tokio General 
Insurance developed its own rainfall insurance product, offered in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka 
and Gujarat in 2004. The same year, AIC introduced “Varsha Bima” (rainfall insurance) in 20 
gauges of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Since then, ICICI has  
expanded its portfolio to cover 11 states with contracts in over 200 locations and up to 13 crops 
per location. Other insurance companies have similarly expanded sales of the product. 
Even before the introduction of ICICI Lombard rainfall insurance, some observers had 
argued that traditional crop insurance could be successfully replaced by other index insurance 
products (Skees, Hazell, and Miranda 1999). In the 2007 union budget speech, the Indian finance 
minister stated that “AIC’s [. . .] pilot weather insurance scheme [. . .] appears to be a more 
promising risk mitigation scheme” and allocated US$25 million to insurance companies to 
further develop weather-based insurance schemes on a pilot basis as an alternative to NAIS. AIC 
launched the first pilot of the Weather-Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) in Karnataka for 
Kharif, or rainy season crops (2007). For Rabi, or winter season crops (2007/08) the scheme was 
expanded to four states, and for Kharif and Rabi seasons (2008/09) to ten states. 
Similar to NAIS, WBCIS also operates on an area approach, except that area payouts are 
linked to a rainfall gauge, rather than measured crop yields. Although insurance companies 
charge actuarial rates, the farmers only pay a premium at par with NAIS. The remainder—
ranging from 25% to 80%, depending on the crop (Hazell et al. 2010)—is borne equally by the 
central and implementing state governments. All insurance companies (both private and public) 
are invited to submit proposals for specific policies, and if approved, they are entitled to this 
premium subsidy support, which is meant as a temporary measure in the hope that the subsidy 
will promote adoption of index insurance and create a long-lasting insurance culture among 
farmers. At present, despite AIC having the largest market share, both ICICI Lombard and 
IFFCO-Tokio participate in WBCIS in various states. 
5.2 BASIX  
In this section we present information on trends in policies sold by BASIX through its company 
Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank since 2003, using administrative data generously 
provided to us by them. BASIX was the vendor for ICICI Lombard’s original pilots of rainfall 
insurance in 2003. After an initial two-year launch with several hundred policyholders in Andhra 
Pradesh, BASIX expanded into five states in 2005. In that year, 6,694 households purchased over 
20,000 phases of insurance, including 43 distinct contracts. 
[Figure 6.4 here] 
[Table 6.1 here] 
Trends in sales of rainfall insurance by BASIX in Andhra Pradesh are presented in Figure 
6.4 and Table 6.1.
6 These data show that there has been a secular increase in the number of 
phases of insurance sold, as well as the number of customers served. The number of purchasers 
increases from 194 households in 2003 to 7,567 households in 2009, accounting for 14,542 
policies. Note that in the table we draw a scored line below 2004. This is because from 2005 
onwards, households were able to purchase individual phases of insurance. (In 2003 and 2004, 
farmers could only buy a policy covering all three phases of the monsoon—we count that as 
three phases of coverage for the purposes of calculating figures in Table 6.1.) Note that these 
trends are not due to any government subsidies, since WBCIS is not active in Andhra Pradesh. 
Policies are priced and sold on a purely commercial basis. 
The “sum insured” in Table 6.1 is the maximum payout of the insurance, meant to 
correspond to cases of crop failure. As shown by the final column of the table, this amount is 
generally more than ten times as large as the policy premium in each year of the sample. Thus, 
the policy provides a very high rate of return in the worst-case scenario, when rainfall is very 
low.  
A contributing factor to the specific types of policies sold that is perhaps generally 
overlooked is the role of insurance agents. In Andhra Pradesh, policies are sold through BASIX 
LSAs, who are responsible for client education and the sale of other microinsurance, savings, 
and credit products. There are on average 13 LSAs in each location (rainfall station), which 
roughly corresponds to a BASIX branch. Each of these LSAs has on average 22 microinsurance 
customers (median is 15), and each customer buys on average 2.7 phases (median is 3, which 
coincides with the bundle policy). Interestingly, our data suggest that around half of the LSAs 
sell exactly the same number and type of phases to each of his or her clients (e.g. one unit of 
phase 1 and one unit of phase 2), even though there is significant variation across LSAs selling in 
a given location. This suggests that households follow the LSA’s suggestions when deciding how 
much insurance to buy. 
[Figure 6.5 here] 
While the popularity of rainfall insurance has increased over this period, growth has been 
steady rather than spectacular. As a point of comparison, Figure 6.5 plots growth in rainfall 
insurance and livestock insurance sold by BASIX since 2005. Over this period, livestock 
insurance coverage has grown fivefold, compared with about a 50% increase in coverage for 
rainfall insurance. This is not simply due to a difference in value, since, as we discuss below, 
payouts on rainfall insurance are if anything greater relative to premiums than is the case for 
livestock insurance. Section 7 describes some of the barriers to household participation in rainfall 
insurance products. 
6. Distribution of Payouts 
How often should a household expect rainfall insurance to pay out? How large is the expected 
return relative to premiums? In this section we present evidence on the distribution of insurance  
payouts, based on a long span of historical rainfall data, combined with contract specifications 
from a previous paper by us. We also present information on actual payouts on policies sold in 
recent years, again based on administrative data generously provided to us by BASIX. 
6.1 Putative historical distribution 
In a previous paper, Giné et al. (2007), we use approximately three decades of daily historical 
rainfall data to estimate a putative distribution of insurance returns, based on 11 different 
contracts offered to farmers in Andhra Pradesh in 2006. We estimate payouts for each year of 
our rainfall data, assuming the 2006 contracts had been available during that year. Each of the 11 
contracts we study is linked to rainfall data from the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD). 
The history of past rainfall data also comes from the IMD. 
The estimated distribution of returns is presented in Figure 6.6, below. The x-axis for the 
graph is “payout rank,” which ranks payouts in increasing order of size, expressed on a scale 
from 0 to 1. Figure 6.6 plots payout amount against payout rank. (The minimum payout is zero, 
the maximum payout is 1,000 rupees.) The calculated distribution presented in the figure 
suggests that returns on the rainfall insurance are highly skewed. The payout is zero up to a 
payout rank of 0.89 (i.e. the 89th percentile), indicating that an indemnity is paid in only 11% of 
phases. The 95th percentile of payouts is around 200 rupees. In about 1% of phases, the 
insurance pays an indemnity of 1,000 rupees, which is the maximum payout for each of these 11 
contracts. Thus, the policies appear primarily to insure against extreme tail events, with around 
half of the value of indemnities being generated by the highest-paying 2% of phases. 
[Figure 6.6 here] 
Giné et al. (2007) also calculate the ratio of expected payouts on rainfall insurance 
relative to premiums. We estimate that this ratio is around 30% on average across the 11 weather  
stations. This relatively low payout rate likely reflects a number of factors, among them a lack of 
economies of scale given the small initial market for the product and limited competition among 
insurance providers. Payout ratios would likely converge to a higher value in a mature market. 
One limitation of Giné et al. (2007) is that the historical record of rainfall may be an imperfect 
guide to the future distribution of monsoon events—for example, because global warming has 
led to a higher probability of extreme outcomes. While some preliminary hypothesis tests fail to 
find evidence of structural change, these tests are likely not to be very powerful, given our short 
history of rainfall data and the skewed return distribution. Below we present some additional 
evidence on actual payouts relative to premiums on policies sold by BASIX since 2003. 
6.2 Recent payouts 
We again use administrative data provided by BASIX to calculate the ratio of total insurance 
payouts to total premiums each year since 2005. We do the same for livestock insurance policies 
sold by BASIX. Results are presented in Figure 6.7. 
[Figure 6.7 here] 
Two facts are apparent from the figure. First, average payouts on rainfall insurance are 
much more volatile, reflecting aggregate variation in the quality of the monsoon. In particular, 
the severe drought conditions of 2009 corresponded to a surge in payouts, which exceeded 350% 
of premiums collected. 
The second fact is that average returns on the insurance product are actually quite high 
over this period and in fact are better than actuarially fair based on a simple average of payout 
ratios across these years. This return is significantly higher than the 30% calculated in Giné et al. 
(2007). This may reflect some unusual shocks over the past few years, particularly the record 
drought in 2009. Alternatively, it may be due to structural change in weather conditions, such as  
an increase in the volatility of the monsoon, which means that the calculations in Giné et al. 
(2007), which are based on historical data, underestimate expected payouts. (In that paper, we 
conducted some simple tests suggesting this is not the case; however, those tests were only 
preliminary in nature.) Notably, returns on livestock insurance are significantly less volatile than 
those on rainfall insurance and average around 60% of premiums collected over this period. 
7. Who Buys Rainfall Insurance? 
In this section we discuss evidence from Giné et al. (2008) which studies factors determining 
rainfall insurance participation. In particular, we estimate a simple regression model of the 
determinants of insurance demand, based on such household characteristics as wealth, 
landholdings, and risk aversion.  
Evidence from this paper relates to a fundamental research question: Why aren’t financial 
products that help pool important sources of idiosyncratic risk (such as rainfall) widely available 
and widely used? A first potential answer to this question is simply that these products are too 
expensive to be attractive to households. Section 6 presents some evidence that rainfall insurance 
expected payouts on average appear to be significantly smaller than average premiums, 
presumably reflecting a combination of transaction costs, limited product market competition, 
and a lack of scale economies. High costs are a persistent feature of financial services offered to 
the rural poor in India and other developing economies, even for financial products that are 
widely used. For example, Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2009) estimate that annual 
operating costs for nonbank microcredit loans are equal to 17% to 26% of loan value—far higher 
than corresponding ratios for consumer credit in the developed world. 
An alternative view is that, while price is an important factor, other factors, such as 
financial constraints, trust, and financial literacy, are equally important barriers to increasing  
market penetration of index insurance products. A more complete selection of potential 
determinants of rainfall insurance demand is presented below. 
1.  Price relative to expected payouts. All else being constant, a higher insurance 
policy price should clearly be associated with lower insurance demand among 
households. 
2.  Availability of alternative risk-sharing arrangements. Some households may 
have limited need for formal rainfall insurance because of the availability of other 
informal insurance arrangements, remittances, government and bank assistance 
during times of drought, and on the like. While these other channels may certainly 
ameliorate demand, as described in Section 3, there is, however, significant 
evidence that households are far from being fully insured against rainfall risk. 
3.  Risk aversion, and basis risk. Any standard model of insurance demand will 
predict that demand is increasing in the degree of household risk aversion. (In the 
limit, a household that is perfectly risk-neutral has no demand for insurance 
whatsoever.) In addition, demand will be declining to the level of basis risk or, 
equivalently, will be increasing in the correlation between the insurance payoffs 
and the risk being insured (see, e.g. Clarke 2010). For example, if the reference 
rain gauge is located far away from the household, measured index rainfall may 
be poorly correlated with the amount of rain that falls on the household’s crops. 
The noisier the insurance payoffs relative to the household’s marginal utility of 
consumption, the lower will be household demand. While basis risk may 
contribute to a modest level of uptake, there is no rigorous evidence quantifying 
its magnitude for products studied in this chapter. A few arguments suggest,  
however, that basis risk may be small. First, rainfall policies insure against near-
catastrophic events (e.g. drought) that are systemic in nature. As a result, if a 
payout is triggered in one location, the probability of a payout in other locations is 
high. The insurance purchaser may be subject to other perils, such as pests, that 
affect crop yield but are not covered by the rainfall insurance policy, but insofar 
as these perils are idiosyncratic, they can be diversified away using existing risk-
sharing networks. In addition, uptake of earthquake and flood insurance in the 
United States has also been characterized by low uptake, although the policy 
covers damages directly and hence there is no basis risk (Kunreuther and Roth 
1998). 
4.  Ex ante liquidity constraints. Insurance premiums must be paid at the start of 
the monsoon, while payouts are not generally received until the end of the 
monsoon season. A liquidity-constrained household may thus have a high 
willingness to pay for insurance but not have sufficient liquid assets at the start of 
the monsoon to purchase it, given competing uses for those funds, such as 
investment in fertilizer or other agricultural inputs. 
5.  Understanding of the product and learning. Most target rural households have 
relatively limited education and may simply not understand the main features of 
the product or be able to accurately estimate the probability of different payoffs. 
Given some ambiguity aversion, this lack of understanding is likely to reduce 
demand. Households may also learn over time about the product by observing 
whether it pays out in response to different monsoon seasons.  
6.  Trust. As with the previous point, households that do not fully understand the 
product may place significant weight on their trust in the insurance provider or the 
individual who markets the product to them. They may also rely on product 
endorsements from a trusted friend, village leader, or family member. Similarly, 
households may perceive a risk of default of the insurance company (Doherty and 
Schlesinger 1990). Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) argue that trust has 
important effects on financial market participation. 
7.  Framing and behavioral influences. Research in psychology and behavioral 
economics suggests households are affected by subtle changes in the way a 
product is presented to them. For example, in a field experiment in South Africa, 
Bertrand et al. (2010) find subtle advertising cues significantly influence credit 
demand. For example, including the picture of a man rather than a woman on an 
advertising flyer for a consumer loan shifts loan demand by up to 2.2% in the 
monthly interest rate. 
7.1 Empirical evidence 
Our research has sought to identify the relative importance of the different demand factors 
described above. As a first simple type of evidence we present results of household surveys from 
our study areas in Andhra Pradesh. The survey ask households to describe in open-ended fashion 
why they did or did not purchase insurance. Responses are classified into one of a number of 
categories. Households that purchase insurance generally cite reasons relating to “security” or 
“risk reduction.” Reasons cited by households that do not purchase insurance are presented in 
Table 6.2. 
[Table 6.2 here]  
In 2006, the most common single reason cited by households in both samples is 
“insufficient funds to buy insurance.” This response is cited by over 80% of households as the 
most important reason for nonpurchase. This response is suggestive of the role of liquidity 
constraints in retarding demand for the product. Explanations relating to product quality, such as 
“it is not good value” and “it does not pay out when I suffer a loss,” are much less frequently 
cited, and only a small fraction of households cite “do not need insurance” as a reason for 
nonpurchase (2.8%). This low fraction appears consistent with the evidence cited in Section 3 
that households are not fully insured against rainfall risk. Notably, in 2004, 21% of Andhra 
Pradesh households cited “do not understand insurance” as the primary reason why they did not 
purchase a policy. This fraction fell to only 2% by 2006, as households became more familiar 
with the product. 
Cole et al. (2009) conduct a series of formal field experiments to provide causal evidence 
on several of the demand factors listed above. In Andhra Pradesh, this is done through 
randomized household visits by an insurance educator, where various aspects of the visit were 
also randomized across households. In Gujarat, treatment consists of either a paper flyer or a 
video about the insurance product; the content of the flyer and video were randomized across 
households. These field experiments suggest that insurance demand is significantly price 
sensitive but also that other barriers, particularly liquidity constraints and trust, are significant 
barriers to higher household participation in index insurance products.  
Giné et al. (2008) also find evidence of liquidity constraints. In cross-sectional 
regressions insurance participation is positively correlated with wealth, even though the benefits 
of insurance are likely to be stronger for the poorest households. This finding is also consistent  
with the survey evidence presented above (i.e. that insufficient funds are the most common 
explanation cited by households for non-purchase of insurance). 
8. Does Insurance Provision Affect Behavior? 
Despite tremendous increases in global agricultural productivity brought about by the Green 
Revolution, traditional farming practices still predominate in many parts of India and in other 
developing countries. This holds despite high expected rates of return from switching to more 
productive technologies such as higher-yielding seeds and fertilizer (see Duflo, Kremer, and 
Robinson [2008] and Suri [2011] for evidence from sub-Saharan Africa). 
Credit constraints and limited access to information are often proposed as explanations 
for low investment and technology adoption in the developing world (Feder, Just, and Zilberman 
1985). An additional explanation may be that low agricultural investment is a constrained-
optimal response to the riskiness of these investments. Although key farm inputs increase 
average agricultural profitability, there is significant variation in their return on investment. For 
example, the application of fertilizer in semiarid areas in India relies on sufficient rainfall for it 
to be effective. Thus, the return on fertilizer investments is very dependent on weather 
conditions, which are beyond the household’s control. Consequently, risk-averse households 
may be unwilling to bear consumption fluctuations associated with these investments and may 
decide not to adopt them or instead to shift toward lower-risk, lower-return alternatives. 
Dercon and Christiaensen (2007) provide evidence of this hypothesis using panel data on 
rural households from Ethiopia. Fertilizer purchases are lower among poorer households due to 
both liquidity constraints and their inability to cope ex post facto with adverse shocks. Thus, lack 
of insurance leads to underinvestment in fertilizer (see also Lamb [2003] and Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg [1993]).  
Some additional supportive evidence is presented by Cai et al. (2009), who examine 
changes in incentives of insurance sales staff to study the impact of insurance on livestock 
rearing in southwestern China. These authors present evidence that increased insurance provision 
increases investment in livestock. Shapiro (2009) presents evidence from Mexico that 
participation in a government disaster-relief program leads to an increase in the use of more 
expensive capital inputs and in the probability of sending a migrant abroad. Laboratory 
experiments by Lybbert et al. (2009) and Hill and Visceisza (2009) also suggest that over time, 
subjects learn the benefits of insurance and capitalize on it. 
For the 2009 Kharif, we designed an experiment to study whether the provision of formal 
insurance led to higher adoption rates of fertilizer and other productive agricultural investments. 
Before planting, participating households were offered, randomly, one of two financial products: 
rainfall insurance policies (similar to what was sold in previous years), or the promise of a cash 
payment equivalent to the expected payout of these policies, to be paid at harvest time. This 
research is still ongoing. 
9. Recommendations 
Rainfall insurance and other index insurance products present a promising way to insure a key 
source of idiosyncratic risk faced by rural households in rain-sensitive areas. While growing over 
time, rainfall insurance take-up is still modest. In part this reflects several barriers identified in 
our research, including high prices driven by transaction costs and a lack of economies of scale, 
as well as liquidity constraints and factors related to trust and learning about the product. 
9.1 Role of government 
In order to ensure that weather insurance is used as an effective poverty reduction tool, the 
government could play an active role by (i) increasing the density of rainfall gauges, (ii) creating  
a regulatory environment that fosters new product development and consumer protection, and 
(iii) fostering competition in the market. 
Historical data are only available from approximately 550 IMD weather stations. These 
are insufficient to adequately cover the 150 million hectares of arable land, and they are rarely 
located in rural areas. In areas underserved by private weather providers, such as NCMSL, the 
government could help increase the density of automated rainfall gauges, which can help 
ameliorate basis risk and reduce the delay before payouts can be calculated and paid.
7 
By reforming the regulatory environment, the government could also improve the ability 
of the industry to underwrite contracts, thereby lowering reinsurance costs.
8 It could also devote 
resources to agronomic research to improve crop models that could lower basis risk by 
maximizing the correlation between the weather index and crop production. 
Finally, the government could foster competition in the sector by scaling up WBCIS 
while providing incentives to insurance companies to lower the premiums. In areas where the 
correlation between rainfall and yields are well established or where basis risk is not a concern, 
WBCIS could be offered alone, but in other areas WBCIS could be perhaps combined with the 
modified NAIS. This way WBCIS would absorb weather risk, while NAIS could cover the 
residual production risk from other perils (pests, etc). 
Although traditional financial markets do not allow households in developing countries to 
fully smooth out fluctuations in their living standards, the state and central governments could 
use weather insurance to hedge against fluctuations in the cost of social programs caused by 
weather events.
9 For example, relief aid and principal or interest waivers are likely to increase 
after a drought or a flood. Similarly, participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act increases during bad monsoons as many of the rural poor decide to leave their land fallow to  
work as laborers instead (Johnson 2009). The government could therefore purchase in 
international markets drought insurance that would pay precisely when the costs of welfare 
programs are higher. 
In 2006, Ethiopia participated in one of the first government-level index-based insurance 
products, a project spearheaded by the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) with technical 
assistance from the World Bank. Twenty-six weather stations throughout the country monitored 
rainfall daily, providing data to the French reinsurance company Axa Re. In the event of a 
drought, Axa Re would have paid US$7.1 million, to be disbursed in cash to as many as 300,000 
farmers. The stations thus served as an early-warning system to trigger aid in the initial stages of 
a drought—up to four months sooner than traditional crisis aid—which would have enabled 
farmers to smooth their consumption by planting alternative crops and/or avoid selling off assets 
to survive. In 2007 the WFP and the World Bank developed software based on weather data to 
enhance this early-warning and monitoring system, and several donors, including the bank, the 
UK Department for International Development, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, are pledging resources earmarked for distribution in case these early-warning 
systems indicate a drought (World Bank 2010). 
9.2 Role of the private sector 
Our research findings also suggest some possible practical innovations to the way the product is 
delivered to households. For example, the importance of liquidity constraints suggests policies 
should be paid out as quickly as possible, especially during the monsoon season, when our data 
suggest households are particularly credit constrained. This has not always occurred in the past, 
at least in our study areas. (On a related matter, it is also likely to be helpful to be as explicit as 
possible up front with the farmer about the timing of the payment of any payouts.) A further  
possible design change would be to combine the product with a short-term loan or, equivalently, 
originate loans with interest rates that are explicitly state-contingent, based on rainfall outcomes, 
to help alleviate credit constraints. 
As another example of ongoing financial innovation, insurance companies are 
experimenting with alternative indexes, like the NDVI, for areas that lack good rainfall data. The 
NDVI index measures vegetation greenness corresponding to the level of photosynthesis in a 
prespecified grid using satellite imagery. These satellite data exist for several years, are difficult 
to tamper with and can be accessed online in real time; this approach may also have less basis 
risk than a rainfall index. In 2005 AIC introduced an NDVI-based insurance product for wheat in 
Haryana and Punjab, but it faced problems due to cloud cover during critical growth periods. The 
Centre for Insurance and Risk Management in Chennai is currently involved in another pilot 
program in Andhra Pradesh. 
In some cases where household financial literacy is low or other barriers to take-up are 
too high, insurance policies could be targeted to a group, such as an entire village, a producer 
group, or a cooperative.
10 The group could then decide or prearrange how best to allocate funds 
among its members in case of a payout. Policies could also be sold to input companies. For 
example, during the 2005 monsoon season, Monsanto bought a bulk weather insurance policy so 
that it could attach free weather insurance coupons for a minimal level of drought coverage to its 
cottonseed packets, which were sold to 100,000 farmers in Maharashtra.
11 
The 11th Indian five-year plan (2007–2012) asks the government to earmark US$7 
billion for insurance, so that 40% of farmers will be insured by 2011/12. Developments in 
rainfall insurance and other microinsurance markets are already contributing toward this  
ambitious goal. As these insurance markets mature, they are likely to significantly improve risk 
management opportunities among Indian households and entrepreneurial firms. 
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Sweden, and the United States (Miranda 1991; Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997). 
4 This accumulation of indigenous knowledge over thousands of years is reflected in literature, 
folk songs, and proverbs or sayings. For example, farmers use the color of the sky, the 
shape and color of the clouds, the direction of the winds, the appearance of certain insects 
or migratory birds, and the like to update the probability that the monsoon has arrived 
(Fein and Stephens, 1987). 
5 Some adjustments are made to accumulated rainfall when constructing the rainfall index used 
to calculate payouts. If daily rainfall exceeds 60 millimeters, only 60 millimeters is 
counted towards the cumulative rainfall index. Also, rainfall less than 2 millimeters is 
ignored. These adjustments reflect that heavy rain may generate water runoff, resulting in 
a less than proportionate increase in soil moisture, while very light rain is likely to 
evaporate before it soaks into the soil. 
6 Although we also have data on BASIX insurance sales in other states, we focus on Andhra 
Pradesh for this analysis to avoid confounding effects associated with the introduction of 
subsidized insurance by AIC under WBCIS in some other states. Policies sold in Andhra 
Pradesh are not subject to government subsidies.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Historical data not being available for these new gauges, however, the process of setting a fair 
premium is complicated, since insurance companies typically add an uncertainty loading 
to the premium. 
8 The World Bank and other partners established in 2007 the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), the world’s first regional insurance fund offering index-
based insurance. Thanks to the CCRIF, member countries saved about 40% of premium 
costs (World Bank, 2010). 
9 Caballero (2000) shows evidence that Chile’s GDP is sensitive to the world price of copper, 
more so than Australia’s GDP is affected by the price of coal. Of course, it is important to 
smooth consumption, not GDP, and while this fact may reflect that financial markets are 
more developed in Australia than in Chile, copper represents a substantially higher share 
of Chile’s economy than coal does in the Australian economy. Despite these criticisms, 
the point remains that Chile has not been able to use financial markets to fully smooth out 
the sensitivity of Chile’s economy to fluctuations in copper prices. 
10 One of the reasons for comparing livestock to weather insurance in Section 5.2 was to 
emphasize differences in the level of understanding across insurance products. For 
example, farmers are far more familiar with livestock death than with a trigger of 
accumulated rainfall measured in millimeters at a nearby rainfall gauge. 
11 See also the case study of PepsiCo potato farmers discussed in Hazel et al. (2010) and a pilot 
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Note: Data for this Figure come from Indian Meteorological Department 
(http://www.imdpune.gov.in/) 
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Note: Figure plots the relationship between insurance payouts and phase rainfall for an example 
insurance contract: the policy covering the first monsoon phase in 2006 for the Mahabubnagar 
mandal. Source: Giné et al. (2007). 
 
 
















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Total Number of Policies Total Number of  Policyholders
 
Note: Trends in sales of ICICI Lombard rainfall insurance in Andhra Pradesh. Figure plots the 
number of phases of policies sold, as well as the number of distinct policyholders. Source: 
BASIX. 
 











2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
livestock weather
Note: Figure presents total nominal premia (in Rs.) paid on livestock and weather 
microinsurance policies since 2005. Data for rainfall insurance is for Andhra Pradesh only, while 
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Note: Figure plots payout amount against payout rank, sorting all putative payouts in increasing 





















Note: Figure plots the ratio of total payouts to total premia paid for livestock insurance and 



























2003  792 194 4.08 
2004  1,305  281  4.64             
2005  9,895 3,062 3.23  927,285  9,894,000  93.71 9.37% 
2006  6,039 4,070 1.48  534,734  6,038,000  88.55 8.86% 
2007  6,396 2,852 2.24  628,265  6,436,000  98.23 9.76% 
2008  9,411 3,619 2.60  910,165  9,411,000  96.71 9.67% 
2009  14,765  7,567 1.95  1,421,190  14,749,000  96.45 9.64% 
Note: In some cases BASIX sold combined policies covering all three monsoon phases. These are 








Table 2. Self-reported reasons for rainfall insurance non-purchase 
 
 
Why did you not purchase insurance?  2004 2006 
Insufficient funds to buy insurance  27.1%  80.8% 
It is not good value (low payout / high premiums)  16.4%  7.85% 
Do not trust insurance provider  2.34%  5.23% 
It does not pay out when I suffer a loss   17.8%  2.91% 
Do not understand insurance  21.0%  2.33% 
Do not need insurance  2.80%  0.58% 
No castor, groundnut  6.07%  n.a. 
Other 6.54%  0.29% 
Note: Non-purchasing households in the study areas Andhra Pradesh and 
Gujarat analyzed in Cole et al. (2009) are asked to explain why they did 
not buy insurance. In Andhra Pradesh, non-purchasing households were 
asked the top three reasons why they didn't buy insurance. Only the 
primary reason cited by the household for non-adoption of insurance is 
reported. This table is reproduced from Cole et al. (2009). 
 
 
 